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In October 2015 PSD2 first adopted by the European Parliament to initiate a new method
of payment system. Since then, it receives several amendment time to time. Strong
Customer Authentication (SCA), one of the major requirements of PSD2 came into
force from September 2019. However, European Banking Authority EBA found it is
challenging to comply with this requirement fully, before the given deadline. Technical
implementation challenge, complex payment systems across EU, bring-in all related ac-
tors under SCA needs to be resolved with profound solution to achieve the PSD2 success.
Moreover, contradictory terms of the PSD2 with GDPR and inadequate protection for the
user’s privacy prevails account access issues that can be circumvented by the payment
service providers. This article investigated the pros and cons of the PSD2, finds feasible
solutions for SCA that seamlessly involves all actors in payment system. Despite the fact
of technical implementation details, a leading PSP’s SCA compliant solution integrated
into an e-invoicing system as an specimen of an SCA compliant model. The model
showcases the SCA conformity then test and verifies security of data and privacy of the
user.
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Chapter 1
Introduction
The recent evolution of the European revised Payment Services Directive (PSD2) [1] com-
prised of several objectives, has drastically emerged the new perception of redesigning the
payment service models. The first payment service directive PSD1 [2] shown exemplary
growth in the payments market. Following the significant growth changes, the adoption
of PSD2 brought concrete advises accommodating the legal framework to support these
developments. The expectations of this framework drive to certainty, competence, and co-
herence among the financial service providers. The outcome of such conformity ensures
fraud protections, client protections, and secured transactions.
The PSD2 framework initiates two new ideas in payment services, called payment
initiation services (PISP) and account information services (AISP). Both of these new
facilities benefit over banks, previously the sole owner of the client’s account information
now follows an obligatory protocol to share their holds with third-party service providers
free of charge, with the consent of the account holders. The inauguration of this access to
personal information demands all related parties in this process to develop and maintain
a secure authentication process that reflects the regulatory technical standards (RTS) and
common and secure open standards of communication. Seemingly, PSD2 points to the
wide development of the payment service market irrespective of security and privacy.
This thesis aims to analyze the risks that are created by access to accounts followed by a
CHAPTER 1. INTRODUCTION 2
successful integration of SCA (Strong Customer Authentication) compliant model, one of
the major requirements of the PSD2, into a system that demonstrates how this requirement
can be achieved without building an extensive new interface for the businesses. Along
the way, we will explore current technologies, as a probable solution that can meet the
PSD2 technical requirements listed by the RTS. Viable recent open-source authentication
solutions exist in the market and already trusted by many leading PSPs will be investigated
thoroughly for reliable SCA implementation. Relatively, the business impacts might cause
due to the new regulation in action, which will be justified by analyzing the stakeholder’s
opinions.
Chapter 2
Access to accounts: PSD2
PSD2 brought businesses advantages for Fintech companies that are dependent on some
considerations. The companies should extend their existing payment systems and prod-
ucts in accordance with the new regulations. However, providing the services largely
depends on the cooperation of the banks as the sole owner of all account information.
Fortunately, PSD2 intervened with such strategies of limiting the market competition by
facilitating payment service access to the payment initiation service providers and account
information service providers.
Regardless of the benefits this third party access also resembles security and privacy
risks. Since the user information e.g. transaction history, personal data, account informa-
tion will be exposed, there are a significant amount of chances of abusing these pieces of
information, for example blackmailing, identity theft, selling in black market or brokers.
As a counter-work, categories of payment service providers listed under Article 1(1) of
the PSD2 to minimize the risks of probable frauds. This list authorizes national central
banks, member states and credit institutions or electronic money institutions (under a, b).
Additionally, any organization that would like to provide payment services throughout the
European Union, can obtain such rights having authorization from a competent national
authority. On the other hand, companies are interested to provide account information
services only, are exempted from required authorization (Article 33) except to apply for a
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registration [1, p. 78].
As account servicing payment service providers, the banks receive fewer benefits ful-
filling PSD2 requirements. The obligation of providing access to accounts to its users
obligated as free of charge. Traditional banking systems are incapable of handling these
matters at this moment. Therefore, upgrading current systems, and developing secure
access could have costly effects. Top of that Article 73(2) says that any unauthorized or
defective transactions even if it is initiated through payment initiation service provider,
shall be refunded by the bank. In addition to that, now the bank’s new competitors will
get control over their accounts information, which leads to reduced interaction with cus-
tomers. As a consequence, the bank might face a hard time selling its own products and
services to customers. Whereas, Temenos expecting banks can also benefit from third-
party innovative services developed from an agile mindset. Traditional business models
and rigid operating frameworks can be overridden partnering legal service providers with
reduced costs, more efficiency, replacing nonstandard ways of accessing user accounts
(screen scraping). Value-added services, products can be developed to provide person-
alized services to the user through application store and smart devices e.g. smartphone,
wearables. Interestingly, The banks will have the opportunities to facilitate interaction
with clients from other banks by registering themselves as a service provider, which can
be seen as multidimensional business scope. [3]
Gartner provided a more specific figure of probable annual increase of revenues for
banks, approximately 30%. The strategy of the Programmable Business Model is ex-
pected to thrive over a decade that will let both internal and external users innovate and
improve new business models with the aid of technologies. The user institutions can
leverage the power of shared access, previously owned by banks only. Consequently, the
banks can have the opportunities of generating multiplied revenues, evolving competent
third parties capable of offering banking services straight to the customers. [4, p. 8]
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2.1 Payment initiation service
PSD2 clearly defined the role of Payment information service (PIS) provider in Article
4(15) as "a service to initiate a payment order at the request of the payment service user
with respect to a payment account held at another payment service provider". Namely, So-
fort, iDEAL and Trustly are some of the giants, accordingly from Netherlands, Germany
and Sweden, in payments industries performing PIS roles for a while. Services offered
online, requires a secure bridge between the client and the merchant, that the payments
are initiating from reliable sources. PSD recital 29, says this secured transactions ensures
merchant to deliver the goods or services to the customer without any undue delay. Note
that, bank must able to distinguish the properties of an payment order to locate it’s origin.
A separate interface handling orders from PIS providers should understand the difference
among all required properties without any overlap. PIS provider service facility fails if it
doesn’t get processed by bank’s dedicated interface.
PIS providers access to client accounts are regulated into Article 66 of PSD2 elabo-
rately. PIS is noted as payers right to receive any online payment services. If services
offered not available online dismisses the right to use PIS. In accordance with Article 64,
when a payer gives explicit consent for payment services to be executed by a PIS, the
bank must respect it to ensure payer’s right. Paragraph 3(Article 66) make sure a PIS
provider hold no rights to retain payer’s funds, and can’t save sensitive payments data for
later use in addition to some other guidelines regarding it’s services. Additionally, PIS
are provisioned to request only the necessary data to the corresponding payments. The
bank must make available all information related to the initiated payments and execution
of them immediately on state change to the PIS provider. However, neither the bank nor
the payment service provider requires to sign any agreement to process such payment
requests. It is independent of any contractual business relationship between them, where
the banks are not allowed to charge any fees for the services.
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2.2 Account information service
Paragraph (27) of the decisions noted under PSD2, after the Directive 2007/64/EC, drastic
change in financial market evolves a demand of new types of complementary online pay-
ment services that provide the payment service users required information of all accounts
held at other payment service providers. The access should be made through the online in-
terface provided by the corresponding account servicing payment service provider. PSD2
advises the security of consumer’s accounts and transaction information enabling them to
act under certain guidelines.
Primary vision of such service development indicates to receive collective information
of several accounts held on different premises with single interface. A typical example
of such intention includes count on user’s average spending per month on different cate-
gories of products to offer customized service or advertisement. Also, interested financial
advisors and credit reference agencies can be a part of this list as well.
Since the services can be accessed online only, Article 67 states regulation regarding
the access which are similar to the payment initiation services guideline. Even though
they share similar access protocols, deep analysis of account information service reveals
disagreement with the regulations. Say for example, bullet point 2(f) of article 67 advised
data cannot be stored, access or use other than the purpose of being used in account infor-
mation service process, with the consent of the service user and data protection guidelines
GDPR. Third party access to the data through account information service is a legal ac-
tion. Formatted product offers are possible to create based on the data received by using
this service. [5, p. 32]
Respecting the regulation, payment information obtained from the account informa-
tion service without storing, should be good enough to use for personalized product mar-
keting. The workaround will evolve proportionately once the open banking facilities are
fully implemented, and available on demand. Moreover, with the consent of the user it
is not clear whether the account information service provider is eligible to process the
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data for other purposes. Point 2(f) of Article 67, advised data can be processed for other
grounds as long as it respect to the General Data Protection Rules(GDPR), which partly
disagree with the point 3(g) of article 66 "not use, access or store any data for purposes
other than for the provision of the payment initiation service as explicitly requested by the
payer". Unfortunately, no specification of user data found that access can be divided into
allowed and prohibited classes for account information services. Regulation says no other
information should revealed apart from the provision of corresponding payment service
which is identical to the data minimisation principle of GDPR (Article 5(1)). Whereas,
required information for the corresponding payment is dependent on the type of services
offered.
The PSD2 aims to facilitate the account information services by registered service
providers than only the bank. To satisfy such intention, limited access to the account data
is a barrier that the insufficient access of data assigned to the service providers would
leave them in a disadvantaged point compared to the sole owners e.g. banks. Therefore,
assigning same rights as the user of online banking services to the account information
service providers are vital to keep rolling the growth of financial market and to achieve
PSD2’s foreseen advantages. In the context of a payment transaction, usually account
information service is involved with two users. In any event initiated by user1 to user2,
including the data processing of user1, the service provider also process data of user2
without any explicit consent given by user2. There is no exception in PSD2 as well
regarding this matter. The processing of this data should be based on the GDPR guidelines
to protect the user2’s privacy. Frequent use of account information services from user1 to
user2, leave a risk of unveiling secret financial state of user2 to the service providers. In
such cases, the silent users (user2) information can be put in large scale privacy risk. For
that, It is important to control the extent of access over the data only in provision to the
service asked for. No later use or forward to other interested parties to build a personalised
profile shall be prohibited. [5, p. 33-34]
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2.3 Secured access and protection of the service user
Security and privacy are priorities on the way of successful PSD2 implementation. A bank
has the right to accept or deny access requests to any account for justified and evidenced
reasons as long as they fall under the criterion of fraudulent or unauthorised. Point 5,6
of article 68 PSD2 highlights this issues in the context of service users privacy. In case
of access rejected shall be informed to the user that the access is denied on the basis
of terms and condition agreed in the form. It is also advised to inform the payer as
soon as the access is denied or if possible beforehand, unless no objectively justified
reasons related to data security or objection from any Union or national law prevent so.
Details of the incident shall be reported to the competent authority whether it is related
to the account information service provider or payment initiation service provider. The
competent authority can investigate the relevant details of the reported issue and take
measures accordingly if requires.
About the data protection, article 94 states that, a member state shall allow processing
of personal data by the payment service providers and payment systems to facilitate any
investigation, prevention and detection of fraud payment activities. Service providers are
eligible to store, process and access personal data only with the explicit consent of the
service user in provision of the requested payment services. Following this, article 95
prescribes to manage all operational and security risks implementing proper framework
including sufficient mitigation measures and control mechanisms that supports detection
and classification of security incidents belongs to operational risks.
Continuing on users privacy, article 97 says, the service providers are bound to use
"strong customer authentication" for both account information service and payment ini-
tiation service to dynamically link the transaction to the amount and the payee. The per-
sonalized security credentials of the service user shall remain confidential and integrity
shall remain intact regardless of the payment initiated through a payment initiation ser-
vice provider or not. The distinguishable elements of strong customer are authentication
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knowledge, possession and inherence, elaborately something unique user knows, some-
thing that only the user possess and something the user is. Each of the properties are
independent of others that the breach of one element shouldn’t affect the credibility of the
others. The definition of the strong customer authentication in article 4 clause 30 provides
a detailed information.
Account information service providers are considered with comparatively less pre-
caution compared to the other payment initiation service providers. Pursuant to article 33
clause 2, account information service providers that do not process any payment services
does not belongs to the rules mentioned in article 94. However, these providers are still
imposed with the data protection law of GDPR as long as they process personal user data.
Therefore, this exception relates only to the clause 2 of article 94. Lack of elegant data
protection rules and the consent received from user are sometimes controversial in a sense
that, users often agree on processing personal data without truly understanding the terms
and condition, even though it is manifested in plain form. The competent authorities of all
member states shall provide adequate guidelines on colliding issues of PSD2 to facilitate
the implementation process of PSD2 nationally. [5]
Chapter 3
Strong customer authentication and
regulatory technical standards (RTS)
Security should be the first concern for all payment service providers when offering ser-
vices online. Communication between the service providers and the receivers should take
place in a secure manner that ensure secured authentication, and alleviates maximum pos-
sibilities of fraud. Transaction observation mechanism should be strong enough to detect
any inappropriate use of user’s personalised security credentials in case of, for example,
lost, stolen and should also assure the corresponding service user’s legitimacy where the
permission is granted consciously to access its account information and initiate any trans-
fer of funds. Additionally, strong customer authentication is necessary to to be applied
as long as the authentication doesn’t meet the requirements, no matter how many times
a payer seek access to its payment account, start any transaction, or perform any action
through a remote channel that carries a risk of fraud or abuse by fulfilling the standard
procedure of authentication code/token generation. The generated authentication code/-
token must be preventive even if it is forged entirely or revealed any of it’s constitutive
elements. The specification of strong customer authentication should be known by the
user, requesting such services. [6]
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Article 66 of PSD2 stipulates, payment service requests initiated by service users
through payment initiation service providers must authorise the access using strong cus-
tomer authentication. The formal definition of strong customer authentication (article 4,
point 30) requires presence of at least two or more unique independent elements a user
possesses on the process of authenticating a payment such as knowledge, possession and
inherence. Since, the breach of one element shouldn’t affect others, it is important to keep
separate the use of personalized security credentials and the independent elements. Im-
peratively, legislative decision point 107, specifically nominated EBA (European Banking
Authority) to draft regulatory technical standards for strong customer authentication with
its expertise and knowledge for reliable, secured communication between parties involved
in a payment service. It is also advised that the draft should be developed in cooperation
with the ECB (European Central Bank) with aggregated consent of the other stakeholders.
RTS advised, it is possible to get exemption from SCA but contingent to couple of
security catalysts level of risk, recurrence, amount and the channel used to execute the
payment. The use of SCA also loose coupled for actions that pose low level risks, access-
ing balance and recent transactions maintaining the due confidentiality, previously setup
or approved recurring payments through the use of SCA addressed to the same payee, and
associated identical payer, payee and the PSP through former transactions. In above sce-
narios, the PISPs, PSPs rely on card based payment instrument and AISPs should request
only the compulsory information from the ASPSP for the provision of any particular pay-
ment service consented by the service user. Contactless small amount payments at the
point of sale, with a certain number of successive payment limits or limited maximum
values of transaction can be executed without SCA to promote user friendly and low risk
payment services. Unattended terminals and the end points where queues happen, should
also be exempted from applying SCA due to the increased time of completing the pro-
cess, operational, safety and relevant security risks. For example, applying SCA in toll
gates, unattended ticket machine could results a in an underestimated long queue. How-
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ever, RTS ascertain that if the exempted value of contactless payment doesn’t set to a
perfect threshold balance between the rising needs of augmented security for remote pay-
ments and the necessity of user friendly and practically accessible payments, the area of
e-commerce can be affected. The threshold balance limit for low-value online purchases,
should be considered in a sensible manner keeping in mind that, the execution of the pay-
ment is not physical with any payment instrument. Thus, the risks of fraud might be a
little higher in online purchase than the physical purchase. RTS promotes the adoption of
effective and risk based requirements for PSPs not interested on applying SCA in case of
real time low risk transactions, which confirms the safety of sensible user data and funds,
are eligible to get exemption. This risk based analysis should comprised of analysis of
abnormal spending behaviour of the user, other risk factors, for instance, monetary based
remote payment fraud rate threshold, calculated based on the location of payer and payee.
If any payment request failed to pass this combined score of risk based analysis threshold,
the PSP shall revert to SCA. Before confirming the maximum exempted risk based value
for a PSP, average of all the fraud rates of all PSPs together with those went through SCA,
within a certain period should take into account on the current basis. [6]
Article 10(2) of RTS, obliged PSPs to must apply SCA, when a PSU seek account
information e.g. balance, transaction information for the first time and when more than 90
days elapsed since the last time the PSU was authenticated for processing any transaction
request using SCA. Similarly, more specific restriction announced regarding the amount
of contactless electronic payment initiated by the user. No more than EUR 50 is allowed
for an individual single payment. In total, the cumulative amount of EUR 150 should not
exceed or the total number of consecutive contactless transaction must be equal or below
5 from the date of last time the SCA applied.
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3.1 Regulatory Tehnical Standards (RTS)
On 27 November 2017, finally RTS was accepted by European Commission after sev-
eral contention about screen scraping authentication process with the EBA. Eventually,
the discussion found a mutual point which released RTS on March 2018 that would be
in effect from September 2019. Inclusion of RTS would complement the goals of PSD2.
Article 115 given a deadline that the PSD2 must take effect from 13 January 2018. Since
then, payment service providers are obliged to receive the benefit of account access. How-
ever, under article 115(5), service providers were active before January 2016 in a member
state are permitted to continue their operation. This also brought a benefit to them that
they are exempted from the security measures as long as the RTS is not in effect. Addi-
tionally, article 115(4) given them the freedom of applying the security measures (article
65, 66,67,97) are not mandatory during this transitional period, rather they are obliged to
manage their operational and security risks to protect personal data.
3.2 Access Interfaces
Communication between the payer and the payee must have reliable security mechanism
implemented, which is one of the payment service providers vital responsibilities. Any
miscommunication through the use of smartphone application from an authorized user to
unauthorised user or to any other service user’s interface should be identified with proper
risk mitigation. As a precaution, sessions linked between the service providers and users
or any other entities can rely on unique session identifier, detailed transaction information
logging and timestamps from a unified system. One ways out of many, such reliable
system services can be ensured using a dedicated access interface.
Article 30 of RTS stipulates the service providers shall enforce a minimum of one
interface that satisfy a few critical features. Firstly, the interface includes the ability
to challenge any payment instrument issued based on card to accomplish identification
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towards the account servicing payment service provider. Next, account information re-
quests for authorised payment accounts or transactions from account information service
providers maintain the integrity throughout the request life-cycle, and finally, the interface
should secure the payment initiation request issued on behalf of the corresponding autho-
rised user accounts with no unauthorised interruption while sending and receiving data
and provide adequate accessible information regarding the execution of the transaction
and account servicing payment service providers. RTS advised that, the interface shall
build on the standards defined by any international or European standardisation organisa-
tions. Once the interface built, required documentation can be requested by the payment
initiation service provider and account information service provider without any charge.
Additionally, the interface facilitate testing including customer support, that payment ser-
vice users will be able to test their corresponding application and software needed to offer
services to user. Account servicing payment service providers will be under surveillance
of competent authorities whether the interface is abiding by the obliged regulations.
According to article 31 of RTS account servicing payment service providers are given
choices to implement either a dedicated interface or the user interface used for their
clients. In case of second option chosen, still the service providers are not allowed to
open the user interface to the payment initiation service users and account information
service providers straight. To request any account and designated transaction informa-
tion, the interface must identify and authenticate them granting access, associated with
the corresponding payment service.
3.3 Consequences of ‘screen scraping’
To provide PSD2 compliant services, the service providers need access to the dedicated
interface enabled by the bank. They are solely dependent on the bank’s functional inter-
face to bridge the clients. Even though RTS enacts several preventive rules, this control
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is considered a possibility that empowers the bank to frustrate the desired market growth
for payment services. Say, for example, limiting the bandwidth and the availability of the
interface can increase tension on the market. As stated above in section 3.1, RTS forced
banks to maintain, update and make available all relevant technical specifications, testing
facilities and any changes regarding communication to the interface.
Figure 3.3.1: Screen Scraping [5]
Considering the facts of influence, the acceptance of screen scraping affects the con-
tent of RTS. Screen scrapping is straight access to the user accounts pretending to be a
user itself, which totally obscures the genuine identity of the party gained access to the
account. Alternatively, credentials belong to the user such as PIN, received to manage the
access to the interface. Most of the biggest payment service providers before PSD2, for
example, SOFORT from Germany, was providing financial services to their users through
screen scraping.
Georg Schardt, Managing Director of SOFORT GmbH, said: "Screen or web scraping
is the simply technology of machine-reading websites, an omnipresent and indispensable
technology for finding information on the internet, used for example for price-comparison
websites, online portals and search-engines such as Google". He emphasized, the technol-
ogy is safe to be used, facilitate sharing customer data with third-party payment service
providers, that leading fin-tech company and the personalized AIS solutions of bank trust
in this form of authentication over a decade. The idea of outlawing the screen scrapping
in PSD2 is dismissed on his logic. If the omnipresent technology of reading websites is
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inhibited, it might be said screen scrapping is now outlawed. But the reality is different.
He mentioned "EBA itself explicitly says in Art. 27(2) draft EBA RTS that using the
online-banking websites constitutes one option to provide a PSD2-compliant interface –
this is screen scraping, as the content of the online-banking websites would be read by the
TPP software". Therefore, the ban on screen scrapping is confusing and pointless. What
EBA actually meant by this is, third party providers are now obliged to identify them-
selves towards the bank rather than just pretending to be a user, he added. Consequently,
if third party providers are able to identify themselves to the bank, it is normal to use
screen scraping and machine-read websites which is identical to the draft RTS in article
27(2). When asked about the ban on screen scraping and possible effects, he is optimistic
about having a combination of screen scraping and identification. On the other hand, he
fears, EBA is trying to impose some political decision, allowing the bank to open up a
dedicated interface or direct access, assigning bank the role of a gatekeeper. Additionally,
free data portability is a direct contrast of GDPR and limit innovative approach in the
fragmented banking industry, in his opinion. [7]
The problem with the screen scrapping is, third party providers manage full access to
the user account without identifying themselves. For any initiated communication to the
bank, initially, it is unknown who is the other party that the bank is going to deal with. The
party on the other side could be a service provider requesting on behalf of a user or it could
be the user itself. Apparently, sensitive account information could be at risk of revealed to
the unauthorized party. Which concerned the EBA and similar to Georg Schardt’s opinion
about screen scrapping later on draft RTS release. Article 31 of RTS, allowed banks to
implement either a dedicated interface or the interface used to authenticate their own users
[6]. In both cases, service providers must identify themselves towards the interface. Many
payment service providers also lobbied against the ban of screen scraping on the basis of
considering it as a back-up option, since the draft RTS mentioned nothing about it, but
the stipulation on performance and availability of dedicated interface expected to be same
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as their own user interface.1. However, the contingency measures provided on article 33
of RTS, prescribed that unplanned unavailability or a system breakdown shall allow the
PSPs to use the interface available for their own users of the ASPSP until the dedicated
interface is restored to the fully operational phase. The ASPSP must identify the PSPs
and trust the authentication procedure of users provided by the ASPSP.
Kelly, operations manager of a renowned company expressed her concern on the
weakness of security and latency of this access method. Corporate access which requires
access to a large pool of data might take even 10 minutes to complete the retrieval. Since
the tools are dependent on the portals intended to be used by customers, minor changes
in portals might break the operation causing significant loss to the dependent businesses.
However, she believes the widespread use of screen scraping apparently adopted because
of no alternatives standard exists before. [8]
Literally, EBA put dispute against this fall-back option. Their viewpoint was, this
might lead to abandoning the development of a dedicated interface completely, opting for
the PSD2 compliant user interface. Development and maintenance of an additional inter-
face concurrently with their own, would impose an additional burden and increased cost
to the ASPSPs, they believe. It is disadvantageous to the PSD2 objective "to standardise
access across the EU Member States and create a single EU payments market". Instead of
the development of an identical communication standard across Europe, upcoming AISPs
and PISPs will have to deal with a plethora of different customer-facing interfaces. Apart
from that, EBA tried to present a substantial amount of argument that the technical abili-
ties of the fallback interface wouldn’t be much feasible than the dedicated interface. Top
of that, EBA also questions the compatibility of the security requirements mentioned in
PSD2 with the fallback interface. [9]
The commission retained the fallback option valid in the executable RTS. However,
1https://www.finextra.com/newsarticle/30772/eba-rejects-commission-
amendments-on-screen-scraping-under-psd2
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an ASPSP can get an exemption from this requirement under certain conditions met.
The competent authorities can grant an exemption pursuant to Article 33 point 6 if the
interface satisfies the obligations of article 32, designed and tested in accordance with
the article 30 point 5, has been in operation for a minimum of three months by payment
service providers, and any seeming problem is resolved immediately. Nevertheless, under
no circumstances, the exempted banks are permitted anymore to use the method of screen
scraping/user interface, since the transition period (Until September 2019) is over now.
3.4 Authentication provided by the ASPSP
Pursuant to article 30 point 2 of RTS, "For the purposes of authentication of the pay-
ment service user, the interface referred to in paragraph 1 shall allow account information
service providers and payment initiation service providers to rely on all the authentica-
tion procedures provided by the account servicing payment service provider to the pay-
ment service user" [6]. So, the payment service providers do not need to develop any
customized authentication mechanism to offer their services. The service providers can
request the banks either including the payment order or seek account information to ini-
tiate the procedure to authenticate the corresponding user. There is no clear information
provided in RTS that how this authentication mechanism can be implemented.
Two approaches can be considered to implement such an interface. In the first ap-
proach, which basically uses the bank’s own client interface, the steps are
1. User creates a payment order through a payment service provider to the bank
2. Bank start the authentication procedure and request for information to the payment
service provider
3. Payment service providers collect required information or personalized security cre-
dentials from the user
4. Bank received the credential from the service provider and given decision
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In the second approach, the authentication can be resolved independently of the ser-
vice provider. The steps are
1. User creates a payment order through a payment service provider to the bank
2. Bank starts the authentication procedure and request for information to the user
3. User provide necessary information as the bank ask for the purpose of authentica-
tion
4. Authentication decision redirects to the payment service provider
Since PSD2 discourages using the user’s personal credentials and corresponding inter-
face for the authentication, we would like to keep the discussion rolling on the second or
decoupled approach of authentication. Regardless of types, the interface should manage
an active session among the participants of an authentication request. The service provider
will redirect the user to the bank, then the bank resolves the identity of the user indepen-
dent of the payment service provider. This approach doesn’t require the personalized
credentials of the user as it is prohibited in PSD2. But, in any case, the payment service
providers are not allowed to request, store and process the user’s personal credentials.
Article 5(1), sub-point (g) of the PSD2 made it compulsory to provide the description of
the process in use to control access to the confidential account information.
Compared to the first approach of an interface implementation, the second approach
imposes a minimum amount of fraud risks. No personalized credentials ever use in the
process of authentication, therefore, no risk of abusing them by the PSPs. Since the
confidentiality and integrity of the user credentials should remain intact, those must not
be exposed to any employee of the PSPs. PSPs are bound to inform the user immediately
as soon as any loss of confidentially happens in their capacity. Banks often warn their
clients, never share login credentials even if it is asked by any staff of the bank. Else,
any corrupted person would seduce the users pretending to be a PSP to share their private
credentials and compromise the security.
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3.5 Authentication provided by the PSP
PSP and AISP are bound to use strong customer authentication. However, instead of im-
plementing own procedure, they can rely or not on the method provided by the ASPSP.
PSD2 and RTS do not force them to use the procedure offered by the bank. They are
open to use any other form of reliable two factor authentication as long as it serves the
purpose securely. The PSP and the ASPSP authentication procedures are inspected under
the same security standards defined by the PSD2 and RTS. Introducing any other form
of authentication procedure might initiate some other form of additional unprecedented
risks. Rather than using separate authentication procedure, using one of them, preferably
from ASPSP might expose minimum risk of circumventing the system by criminals. Us-
ing both procedures of the PSP and the ASPSP, despite the fact of manipulating strong
authentication for PSP similar to the ASPSP, can lead to a multiplied attack vectors. An
ASPSP wouldn’t be able to identify whether the user is different than the original owner,
unless they use digital signature including their authentication mechanism. Verifying the
consent given by the user original or fake to process the authorisation to a PSP might be
in doubt. Consequently, the dependency for the verification shifts to a PSP then, which
wouldn’t be an ideal reflection of PSD2 regulations at all. Regardless of any authorisation
consent given by the user, the PSPs are permitted in PSD2, to access the content of the
user accounts in ASPSP. This indicates a risk of reveling user transaction information to
unauthorised third parties, say for example, an incident of compromised PSP computer
system which provides unlimited access to the user accounts.
Chapter 4
Identification and authentication
management
As PSD2 demands the interaction of the payment service provider during the process of
authentication, it is hard to find such technology as a pack that satisfy such triangular
authentication needs. Precisely, there is no federated solution yet available. The solu-
tion must ought to protect the identity of the user and associated parties in the process of
authentication. Moreover, article 4 of the RTS prescribed the standard an authentication
procedure must comprised of. The authentication code generated using the elements cat-
egorized as knowledge, possession and inherence, will be accepted only once by the PSP
to initiate transaction, grant online access to accounts, or to perform any other actions take
place through a remote channel that are vulnerable to the risk of fraud. To accomplish this
intention PSPs are advised to develop and deploy security measures, that must satisfy a
few important requirements. First, disclosure of the authentication code must not reveal
any confidential information regarding the user and the transaction. Second, previously
generated authentication code and any knowledge extracted from that can not be reused to
generate a new authentication code. Third, the security strength of the authentication code
should ensure it cannot be reproduced. SImilarly, article 5 of the RTS and 97 of the PSD2
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demands dynamic linking of each part of the transaction process. For instance, while a
transfer initiate, the authentication code should bind to the specific amount and the payee,
which must be visible to the payer. Altered values of any of those elements than when
initiated, should invalidate the payment request immediately. The same goes for the PSP,
while accepting the authentication code to a corresponding payment, that the amount and
the payee is intact as when initiated and no alteration took place during the lifetime of the
payment process. This way the integrity of the payment process can be ensured. Consid-
ering the current technological improvement, two major sustainable solution SOAP and
REST can be think of, for web implementation of above requirements.
The final report of EBA on draft RTS [10] requires that, a TPP (payment service
provider) can be verified by using qualified certificates as mentioned in article 3(30) and
3(39) of the eIDAS regulation. The verification held on web, must need this qualified cer-
tificate for create electronic seals to verify the identity of the TPP. If the XML based mes-
sage used, European Standards Organization ETSI developed a digital signature mecha-
nism which can be used for proving. However, the the electronic seal doesn’t have to be
a qualified one, but can be generated without a qualified electronic seal creation device as
mentioned in the article 39 of the eIDAS regulation.
Security Assertion Markup Language(SAML) and OAuth version 2.0 can be consid-
ered as good options to build such triangular authentication relationship. Despite the
different design patterns both comprised of, they are noteworthy to support the second
approach of authentication mentioned above. With the aid of SOAP or REST based in-
terface implementation both SAML and OAuth are substantially capable of handling the
PSD2 compliant interface requirements.
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4.1 Security Assertion Markup Language(SAML)
Figure 4.1.1, SAML process usually consists of three parties, the user, the SP (service
provider) and the IDP (identity provider), who communicate with each other. The con-
sumer of SAML assertion is the service provider. As mentioned in PSD2, the execution
of a business process requires an authorisation from the user to ASPSP. SAML V2.0 sup-
ports this kinds of delegation with a standard way.
Figure 4.1.1: SP initiated Single Sign-On Service [11]
No specific technical method pointed as mandatory to link up the assertion made by
SAML, say for example to bind the assertion with SOAP. However, REST based API
stipulates to bind the assertion to a custom authorization scheme. The delegation variants
of the SAML uses a field "DelegationRestrictionType", that names the authorised entities
permitted to delegate the assertion. It makes easier the involvement of an ASPSP as fourth
participant after the user, SP and the IDP in a typical SAML authorisation procedure. An-
other variants of SAML called forwarding has a main difference with the delegation ver-
sion that, the user agents directly authenticates to the IDP, then received assertion delivers
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to the intermediary SP. The intermediary SP acts as an subject forwarding the assertion to
the another SP for authentication requirements. This another SP accept this assertion as
long as it knows, the assertion is coming direct from the user agent. Whereas, delegation
method doesn’t pretend the intermediary SP to be a direct user agent while sending re-
quest to another SP, rather the SP authenticates requesting back to the IDP with the same
subject. A new assertion then issued listing the intermediary SP as a delegate of the sub-
ject. In a nutshell, the delegation variant is intended to address multiple intermediary SPs
involved in a transaction altering the path by each SP. These intermediary SPs are labeled
as delegates and the assertion as delegate assertion. Such multiple tier delegation reflects
the requirements of PSD2, therefore, made it one of the ideal candidates for the PSD2
compliant identification management interface. [12]
SAML assertion works both as authentication and authorization token. To use SAML
assertion as a token in an API call, the same assertion should be added. Additionally,
the assertion must include the information of interface access control, being aware of, the
token will be used as an authorisation token for granting privileges, i.e. transaction, as-
signed to a user. The assertion can hold the authorisation statements using eXtensible Ac-
cess Control Markup Language(XACML) [13], an attribute-based access control system
(ABAC) that assign grants whether an user is authorised to access a resource. The state-
ment is encapsulated inside the SAML assertion identity profile and considered secured
from tampering. However, in case of exchanging the user access rights over non-XML
based protocol, the JSON version of XACML should be a better choice. Regardless of
the XML or JSON format of XACML used, the authorization statement will be encoded
as standard SAML attributes that an ASPSP can verify it’s integrity whether it is issued
by the authentication interface, with a XACML system or any subset of XACML system.
The assertion used for latter cases, for example long term access, probably issued for a
certain amount of time compared to the one time use of transaction case. Remarkably, the
security concern e.g. replay attack considered crucial in SAML. As a Consequence, main-
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taining a list of consumed assertions as long as validity time is not expired are compulsory
on the receiver end. [14]
4.2 OpenID Connect (OIDC)
Apart from the SAML architecture, OAuth 2.0 [15] is an another good solution to reflect
on PSD2 requirements. The OAuth 2.0 addressed a few problems in the context of shar-
ing a protected resource with third-party applications (TPA). The resource owner share
it’s personal credentials with the TPAs to grant consent of access, which is not only the
consent, rather the full access to all resources protected under that credentials. This kind
of action results into more severe problems and limitations.
1. The credentials are stored typically in clear text by TPA, for latter use
2. Regardless of weak password used that is vulnerable to break, the server needs to
support password authentication
3. Unlimited access to owner’s protected resources by TPA which is supposed to be
for a particular duration and to the subset of resources
4. Cannot differentiate the TPAs, in case of resource owner want to revoke the access
rights given earlier. Whether revoke all or none
5. Security break in TPAs literally compromise the credentials of the end user causing
the protected resources open to uncountable unauthorised parties
The above issues are carefully considered for OAuth and the outcome was an addi-
tional authorisation layer separating the role of a client from the role of resource owner.
Figure 4.2.2 shows the protocol flow of OAuth 2.0. In this refactored version, resource
owner and resource server (hosts resources) controls the request of access by the clients.
If authenticated, the clients are provided with a different set of credentials called access
token, than those of the resource owner. The access token is well founded to a set of
attributes, e.g. lifetime, scope and access grants, intended to be used by the client. Prior
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Figure 4.2.2: OAuth Protocol Flow [15]
the access token is issued, the resource owner approve the client to receive access grants
with the authorisation server. Now the client is eligible to access the protected resources
hosts by the resource server [15]
SAML usually needs wise consideration of how the assertion will be validated based
on the execution context. On the other hand, OAuth 2.0 drives the SPs to receive a limited
access to an HTTP service (ASPSP) on behalf of the resource owner having an interac-
tion between the resource owner and the HTTP service (ASPSP) or by permitting the SPs
to receive access on its behalf. Here the resource owner can be substituted with the ser-
vice user to represent the compliance of PSD2 with OAuth 2.0. The OIDC which is the
OAuth 2.0 built on, can be used for secured user authentication straight to the SPs. OIDC
accepts different modes of operation depending on the use case scenario. Including a redi-
rect URI with a "response_type" and "response_mode" parameter OIDC is able redirect
the outcome of any authentication request through the user to the SP. The authentication
scenarios are named Flows, which allows a resource owner to share protected resource be-
longs to him, without sharing his personalized credentials. The SP can use access token
provided by the OAuth 2.0 server, to manage access to the protected resources delegat-
ing the resource owner. Among different types of Flows, the Authorization Code flows
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mostly used for server side and client side applications. An ideal example of this flows
reflects, how facebook and google accounts used to log in other service providers web
application. The security of the payload, including ID Token, response and the request
object, ensured using JSON Web Encryption(JWE). Also any confidential data sent by the
SP to the user are encrypted and signed as long as the Request object used. The confiden-
tial data can also be transmitted as a XACML payload. To comply with the REST based
structure a JSON version of XACML can be considered too. Precisely, OIDC follows two
steps authorisation protocol to access a protected resource. First, the ID Token used to
authenticate the service user against a SP. Second, an Access Token received in exchange
of ID Token which is used as a key to access the restricted resources owned by the user.
Any transaction request towards an ASPSP, attach this Access Token as Authorisation
Header in an HTTP request, which sends it in an encrypted form. OIDC encourage to
use a REST base API, since it doesn’t advise any alternative ways of sending the autho-
risation information. However, any single authentication request can be handled as well
using JWT encryption mechanism. [14]
The technical solutions for both SAML 2.0 and OIDC are necessarily resilient to the
standards of the PSD2 in terms of identity and access management for the PSD2 com-
pliant financial industry. Different approaches of these two solutions, met the necessary
properties needed for the implementation of the PSD2. While SAML 2.0 offers a variety
of composable specifications, still it would be nice to reconsider using its features and
extensions in terms of defending certain security properties. Conversely, OIDC offers
a kind of monolithic framework. Logically, the structure offers by OAuth 2.0 / OIDC,
comparably easier to build the system on top of it than top of SAML 2.0.
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4.3 Additional safety precautions
To apply additional security precautions, the PSPs could bring under the provision of one
time or certain time interval authorization against the ASPSP’s authentication procedure.
This might not be a solution to the probable risks but an additional security step to the pre-
vention of unauthorized access. For instance, an authentication completed on the PSP’s
end with the user’s biometric, an ASPSP cannot guarantee the biometric originally be-
longs to the account holder. This gap of authentication procedure can be eliminated, if the
PSP count on ASPSP’s authentication procedure. Note that, the PSD2 never decides any
certain structure of the authentication procedure of the ASPSP. Thus, adding a one-time
authorization in the flow of authentication can add value to the secured implementation
of the system.
But the refusal of access to the accounts until the SP is authorized to the ASPSP,
shouldn’t be right action since PSD2 and RTS has no explicit mention of such obligation.
If we take a look back on the article 68 point 5 of PSD2, which allowed the ASPSP to
deny access request for objectively justified and duly evidenced reasons in provision to the
fraudulent access to the payment accounts. The risks are apparently related to the access
right to a payment account, therefore, the possibility of being abused depends on granting
access to the payment account. In addition to that, active fraud detection and transaction
monitoring mechanism systems are compulsory for the PSP and ASPSP to detect fraud
and unauthorized requests. When any PSP is objectively suspected of not using the PSD2
compliant authentication procedure, the ASPSP can stipulate one-time authorization to
verify the association between the user and the account owner. Out of many, for instance,
an abnormal spending pattern shall force the use of one-time authorization.
Article 68 of the PSD2 prescribed the service provider’s use of payment instruments
and access to the payment accounts. Point 1 suggests that the service user and the corre-
sponding service provider(SP) can agree on the spending limit for the payment transac-
tions initiated through a payment instrument, used for the purpose of giving consent. It
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could be also possible, the exception of using the limit can be applied when the SP’s au-
thentication procedure doesn’t comply with the authentication procedures of the ASPSP.
The framework contract signed between the user and the SP or the ASPSP can have a
reserved right to reject or interrupt the payment instrument for objectively justified rea-
sons, any fraudulent and suspicious use of the payment instrument, or credit line of the
payment instrument pose a significant risk of confidence, the payer wouldn’t be able to
pay back. Such unforeseen cases cannot be resolved beforehand but contact the payer
where possible beforehand or immediately after the interruption with the reasons in an
agreed manner, unless objectively justified security reasons compromise or forbidden by
national legislation or relevant Union.
Application of one-time authorisations is contingent based on the fact that RTS and
PSD clarified nothing regrading the circumstance it can be applied. The user account and
personal data are essentially secured with the use of it. But, the market competition can
be affected because of this additional step of authentication before the access is granted.
Nevertheless, the intended security should be a priority against the feeling of an added
additional obstacle to the authentication process. Rather than a transaction request re-
jected by the ASPSP, adding this extra layer of security might facilitate the authentication
process sometimes. However, PSD2 aims to widen the financial market, therefore actions
halt its acceleration should be carefully considered before the implementation.
Chapter 5
Development of an SCA integration
model
The discussion above clarifies the fact that SCA strongly relates to the PSP and ASPSP
and the user. The new regulation forced all PSPs to be registered and identify themselves
against the authentication interface of the ASPSP. Even in the case of a screen scraping
access method used, the procedure should be the same. The valid PSPs are obliged to
register to their local competent authority. The SCA integration model depends on third
party PSP API called Stripe [16] to continue it’s business payment services. The host
business model is an e-invoicing company, facilitates the process of invoicing for their
customers electronically. Since the customers are basically involved with the construction
business, their subcontractors and employees deal with the collection of spare parts and
the installation of those spare parts, which also need to be billed to their employers.
Irrespective of places and time employees e.g. plumbers should be able to send in-
voices to the accounting department to create proper invoices to be sent to the end-user
who consumed the services. The invoices usually include the price of spare parts as well
as the wages per hour. Figure 5.0.1 depicts a graphical flow of the whole business process.
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Figure 5.0.1: Ecom business model
5.1 Subscription and payment process
The service offered to the customers has a monthly billing period comprised of several
different package options. Packages are combined facilities for the admins and users to
access resources. The more resource a customer use or the facilities seek for, the more
he/she pays. However, the price comes as a fixed wholesome doesn’t vary on the amount
of resource use. Precisely, the customer opts first what packages are suitable for their
operation instead of pay as you go. Of course, they are open to extending it later if
wishes. Since, the business model exchanges services against the money with customers,
it depends on a PSP to deal with the billing to reduce the overhead of manual billing,
fraud, and improve reliability. The host business has its own automated billing controller,
that initiates the payment request to the PSP on due dates.
In the context of PSD2 and SCA, The host business model is inevitably associated
with the payment service provider or PSP. Ecom accepts only CNP (Card Not Present)
based payments to buy a subscription. Handling payments on the business end usually
imposes a handful of fraud risks, since the identity of the payment initiator is unknown.
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The additional authentication step 3D secure was a proven cure associated with the card-
based payment fraud. VISA and MasterCard already using 3D secure 1 before PSD2.
Another successor 3DS2 (3D secure 2) compliant with PSD2 about to be released soon.
Undoubtedly, this would be appreciated as well to strengthen the card-based payment
security. 3DS2 enables the bank to receive more necessary data for the corresponding
payments from the PSP and businesses e.g. shipping address, device ID and transaction
history. The more information is available regarding the payer and payments, the fast and
frictionless authentication procedure it follows. However, when it fails to prove as a le-
gitimate user and owner of the card, the user is forwarded through a challenge, that needs
an additional authentication confirmation for example, from the bank’s app, installed in
the user’s smart device. These uncertain authentication situations, additional authentica-
tion call depends on the time, place, user, amount, transaction history, etc. Concurrently,
different banks may have different procedures and authentication solutions to reflect on
PSD2. No doubt, it would be time-consuming, cost-oriented to develop, cumbersome,
need continuous maintenance and attention which probably appear as too much overhead
along with maintaining own business. Top of that, deploying own fraud protection mech-
anisms wouldn’t be a cheap solution to buy. Stripe as a PSP handles all those matters,
introduced by the ASPSPs as per PSD2 regulations.
The use of smartphones makes 3DS2 easier to implement through the use of the ap-
plication provided by the ASPSPs. This out-of-band communication, accept confidential
credentials from the user that denotes the legitimate use of the smart device and applica-
tion. Instead of forcing the cardholder to remember a password, it can authenticate the
user through the smart device’s built-in secured fingerprint authentication or face recog-
nition. Undoubtedly, it’s a remarkable improvement compared to the 3D secure 1’s reg-
istration and additional time-consuming authentication steps. In addition to this fast au-
thentication process, 3DS2 executes on the client site without the full page redirect. The
challenge flows now embedded within the web itself. The cardholder wouldn’t be redi-
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rected to a new page rather the 3DS2 authentication flow appears on the checkout site as
a modal. This is a feature of improved user experience. A PSP can request an exemption
from SCA to 3DS2 based on its own calculated threshold for a payment request. If the
request is allowed to pass through the friction-less flow, then the PSP won’t be benefited
from the liability shift in case of fraud claims. The widespread use of 3DS2 by the ASP-
SPs wouldn’t take place so fast since the adoption of all of the individual card issuer is
crucial. Partially, country and region are variables as well to its successful adoption.
Stripe supports both 3DS2 and 3D secure 1 on their payment API. As the card holder’s
bank ask for version 1 or 2, it automatically falls back into the requested version. Handling
this process happens dynamically for high-risk payments. Mobile applications, both IOS
and Android support an in-app authentication process, that prevents clients from redi-
recting outside of the application offering a smooth on-site experience. The automatic
fallback option to 3DS2 or 3D secure 1 remains the same for the mobile OS.
5.2 Multi-factor authentication
Ecom considers data security seriously to tie the user’s trust to the business values. Apart
from the user name and password-based authentication, multi-factor authentication acti-
vation is available as an optional layer of security at this moment. Optional means, the
authentication is not forced to use, but the user chooses whether to activate it or not.
Breaking digital accounts weigh easier, safe from unveiling the identity than physical
breaking inside any protected resource. Organized cybercrimes e.g. malicious attacks,
session theft, data breach, repudiation, hacks are always rising rather slowing down. Tra-
ditional security systems are obsolete to the sophisticated cyber attacks resulting in the
personal data breach. Being aware of severe financial and business loss, consumers are
given the option to reinforce their account’s security through the use of multi-factor au-
thentication.
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2FA (Two factor authentication), a sub-type of multi-factor authentication is imple-
mented as an additional layer of security that represents something the user has, some-
thing the user is and something the user knows. Which is similar to the strong customer
authentication requirements. Instead of providing access, this additional layer of security
comes in action after the user completes the username and password authentication. 2FA
asks for another secret from the users that agreed during the time of enabling 2FA. It could
be a PIN, OTP (one time password), answering secret questions or a keystroke pattern.
Since both authentication layers are independent of each other, it is highly unlikely that
even if the user’s first layer of security credentials (username and passwords) are stolen,
the attacker will gain any access to the account. But still, the user needs to be aware of
this and enable the security measures properly, for instance, lock smartphone with a pass-
code or bio-metric data, use a random PIN for the authentication application that can’t be
guessed in one or two attempts.
Given so many options available, we opted Time Based One Time Password (TOTP)
for this second layer of user accounts security with Google authenticator. Even though,
this authenticator application might not be the best choice to be used for clients, at this
moment it is good enough to satisfy the second layer of security needs before the next
viable solution implements. The user sends a request to enable 2FA to the server, then
the server response back generating a unique random secret key to be used on google
authenticator API that generates a QR image. Users can use the google authenticator app
to scan the image that specifically created for the corresponding user. A 6 digit TOTP
keeps generating in the authenticator application against the user’s profile as long as the
application is open in the smartphone. Each key will remain valid for 30 seconds. Once
the time expired a new key will be generated. Since the OTP is time-based, it always uses
real-time for the key generation.
Despite the google authenticator implementation, there are a few more 2FA options
available to choose from as a replacement in the future. SMS based 2FA has been in mass
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use for a while. This form of authentication interacts directly with the user’s registered
smartphone connection. Once the user passes through the first layer of identification, an
OTP token is sent to its smartphone as a text message. As soon as the OTP arrived, the
user should type it on the required field and send back to the authentication server to
verify. If succeed the user is given access to the intended resources. Similar to the text
OTP, not common anymore, voice-based OTP delivery is another option. Unfortunately,
SMS or voice-based 2FA is marked as the least secure methods of identity verification
in recent times. Therefore, it should be avoided for websites that deal with high risks
operations e.g. payment, invoicing, money transfer, store personal transaction data.
Push notification is a popular form of 2FA nowadays. However, it has dependencies on
the internet. User’s smartphone, retailer and the 2FA has a triangular secure relationship
among them in this process. It eliminates the use of OTP from the verification process.
The user’s smartphone or device should be capable of installing apps, which can receive
the push notification and prompt the user for consent. Based on the access request the
user can response back through the app. Conveniently, the risks of phishing, a man in
the middle attack or any other form of penetration must be very hard to compromise the
security of this identification method. The downside of this method is a consistent internet
connection, but in the context of security, no doubt this could be one of the best options
for now. 1
5.3 Scope of this Thesis
PSD2 identified significant scopes to develop the financial market to it’s maximum pos-
sible within Europe. It is not worth and limited by time to address everything n this
thesis. We would like to see how the payment service providers equipped themselves
against the new rules and regulations. Since the real-time market analysis data is not pos-
1https://authy.com/what-is-2fa/
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sible to retrieve, we need to depend on assumptions only for the future market prospects.
However, Ecom as an e-invoicing business company more or less have to deal with the
situations, because of the transaction happens with most of the banks in Finland. We
want our customers to experience a smooth billing process without any friction on the
payment system. To facilitate the whole system, the business process is contingent on
the friction-less payment system. The fraud protection mechanism is underlying within
the Stripe. A reasonable amount of discussion took place in different parts of this thesis
already. We are not going to emphasize on it anymore. The integration code is more than
what we have put below and the whole model is connected from all angels of our system
customers. As a result, depicting all the connected corners wouldn’t be possible through-
out the integration process described below. In most cases, we will try to stick with Stripe
acquisition, initialization, customer creation, how to charge the customer on session, cre-
ating a relationship between the customer and the payment method they choose and most
importantly PSD2 compliance handling.
5.4 Integration of PSD2 compliant Stripe API
As it is mentioned beforehand Stripe [16] handles the money moving part from customers
to Ecom accounts. It offers versatile payment options for the checkout flow e.g. cards,
wallets, local payments. The checkout flow is optimized pretty well for mobile appli-
cations and mobile web as well. In our context, only CNP payment checkout flow is
relevant to discuss in detail, seeing that only CNP based payments are accepted at this
moment to build professional business relationship with Ecom. A customer must have to
have a credit/debit card to pay their bills.
Initially, the integration model divided into two main areas, client-side implementation
and server-side implementation. The whole process of integration altogether can be fit
into 5 major steps. Since we aim to recurring payments from the customers in the future,
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we save the card details and customer information for later use. However, Ecom only
charge customers on session, which means when the customers are themselves on the
checkout flow. We don’t charge customer off session. We will discuss later on the step
how to bring the customer on session for payments that charge later before the due date.
Step 01, Install Stripe (Server-side): Stripe should be set up on the server-side as an
initial step. Official libraries are available for most of the popular platforms to access the
API from the application. In our case, we choose npm version and install the package in
our back-end server. To initialize the Stripe library with our business account, remember
we need an active Stripe account that provides us a secret API key.
1 const stripe = require(’stripe’)(your_secret_API_key);
Step 02, Create Customer (Server-side): Creating a new customer on Stripe is a
must to set up any intents. When a customer appears in Ecom checkout flow, we check
whether we created this customer in Stripe’s Customers table or not. On successful cre-
ation, we save unique customer_id on Ecom storage associating with the customer in-
formation, else we find the payment method from the customer information and avoid
creating a new one. The request initiates from the client-side, and fetching or creating a
new customer id happens on the server-side then returns securely back to the client-side.
Figure 5.4.2 shows how the process takes place.
1 app.post(’subscription’, async (req, res) => {
2 const { systemCustomer } = req;
3 const payload = {
4 name: systemCustomer.name,
5 email: systemCustomer.email,
6 metadata: {
7 ’Ecom Jet SystemCustomer ID’: systemCustomer.id
8 }
9 });
10 const response = await stripe.customers.create(payload);
11 res.json({ client_id: response.id });
12 };
Figure 5.4.2: Create customer in Stripe
Step 03, Create Setup Intent (Server-side): We want our customers to set up for fu-
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ture recurring payments. To do so, in Stripe we need to create an intent with Stripe Setup
Intent API. Precisely, we are saving the credentials to charge the customer in the future.
Once the payment method is set up, it is possible to reuse the method, for different use
cases. The SetupIntent object keeps updating during the process of setting up the card e.g,
validity check, authenticating customer. A card set up for off session payments certainly
needs permission from the cardholder. An agreement is necessary between the service
receiver and provider. In terms of SCA, it is mandatory to get the cardholder’s permission
before we save it for future charges. The terms of service of the service providers should
include information at a minimum, consent for recurring payments, payment amount de-
termination policy, and what interval the charge will be made. Then, all off session pay-
ments are tagged as Merchant initiated transaction (MIT) by Stripe, which is identical
to the request exemption from SCA that let customers be independent of their presence
while making a charge. Literally, the success of the exemption request is contingent on
the card issuer bank. Only they decide whether to pass this request through a friction-less
gateway.
1 app.post(’/generate-intent’, async (req, res) => {
2 // send customer id (optional) if created already in Stripe
3 const intent = await stripe.setupIntents.create({
4 customer: customer_id,
5 usage: on_session
6 });
7 res.json({ client_secret: intent.client_secret });
8 });
Figure 5.4.3: Create setup intent
Nevertheless, as mentioned earlier, Ecom doesn’t charge customers off session but
on session yet. However, the UI and the backend server is continuously improving that
the off session charge might be available before this writing finished. A parameter called
usage passed to the Setup Intents API, while creating an intent (Figure 5.4.3) tells Stripe
to charge the customer now. Basically, this parameter is designed to succeed payment
requests initiated with the presence of the cardholder on session. Note that, it is possible
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to charge a card off session, previously which was saved as on session. The concern is,
the card issuer bank is highly probable to send the request through the challenge flow
since the initial card setup wouldn’t be identical to the request. Stripe marked usage
parameter as an optimization to the payment request. Therefore, the authentication from
the customer could be obvious in either case. Consequently, a recovery process is intended
to exist to take over on failure. So that the customer can be notified about the failure
and bring him on session in the checkout flow to complete the payment process. At
this moment the recovery process implementation is under development since charging
customer off session is not available now. The recovery process might include but not
limited to notifying customers via SMS, email immediately after the payment process
failed for off session payments.
Figure 5.4.4: SetupIntents Object
Figure 5.4.4 represents an SetupIntent object comprised of fields regarding a card-
holders detailed credentials. Notice carefully, the red marked field client_secret, a unique
identifier key returned by Stripe to be tied with the client’s card. This intent is not tied to
any card yet, rather a usable registered intent from the stripe. Now a customer card can
be bind with this intent for future use. The purpose is basically to create a confidential
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separation between the client and service providers e.g Ecom, that never exposes the card
number directly to the service provider for security. client_secret uniquely links to the
customer’s card and lets us perform several actions, for example, set up confirmation, up-
dating payment details, authenticate and validate the card without exposing the customer.
Note that, due to the client_secret’s confidential priority it shouldn’t be logged, embed in
any parts of our application.
Step 04, Collect Card Details (Client-side): For the client-side setup we start with
installing npm package react-stripe-elements. This time we use React library 2. Before
all, we include Stripe.js script in our application and load it before calling any of the Stripe
components. It has full integration support of Setup Intents API.
1 npm install --save react-stripe-elements
After the Stripe.js script loaded, we initialize a StripeProvider component with Ecom
publishable key as props and wrap Elements 3 and all sub-elements under this component.
Elements is the parent of a set of nested UI components e.g. inputs, buttons, to build
a card data collection form on the client-side. All sensitive information lies within this
are tokenized, and handled by Stripe securely without any interaction with our applica-
tion. We skip some underlying component implementation details and their configuration
to keep this reading comprehensive enough. Our main aim is to collect user card de-
tails. Therefore, we need CardElement wrapped with InjectStripe function component,
that provide us the Stripe handleCardSetup functions to link up the setup intent with the
customer card. CardElement is an optimized Stripe react form, that collects all necessary
card details in a single input and securely sends it to the Stripe server for verification.
The setup is ready now to confirm a setup intents. Please see Figure 5.4.5 for the
whole process. While filling up card details verification process keep running accordingly
by Stripe. On success, submit button will be visible to make final charge. Remember, as
we discussed earlier of SCA regulations, customer must be informed that we are saving
2https://stripe.com/docs/payments/save-and-reuse
3https://stripe.com/docs/stripe-js#react
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1 const handleSubmit = async (ev) => {
2 // stop default page refresh.
3 ev.preventDefault();
4 setInProgress(true)
5
6 // create a card set up intent
7 const paymentIntentClientSecret = await fetch(’POST’,’/generate-
intent’)
8
9 // card set up intent succeed, set up the card now
10 const result = await stripe.handleCardSetup(
paymentIntentClientSecret, {
11 payment_method_data: {
12 billing_details: {
13 name: cardHolderName,
14 email: billingEmail,
15 }
16 }
17 })
18 if (result.error) {
19 // handle error
20 } else {
21 // Card set up done, create a payment method and attach to
customer
22 await fetch(’POST’,’/payment-method/’+ result.setupIntent.
payment_method)
23 }
24 }
Figure 5.4.5: Card set up and payment process
their card for possible reuse later. Stripe CardElement is highly customisable for this
sort of intent, to add a few lines of text regarding how we are going to use this card
details later. We submit the form, and that send a request (line 7) now for a payment
intents to the backend server as mentioned in step 03. As soon as the response arrives, we
extract the client_secret field and Stripe suggests we handle it with security precaution in
mind. Along with the client_secret, on the next line we call handleCardSetup function
that set the payment card in Strip server for later reuse. Additional parameter billing
details are saved as well to tie our customer with the card setup. Setup intents field
result.setupIntent.payment_method returns with an unique identifier value assigned to it
which we save to the provided customer on Stripe.
Chapter 6
Verification and testing
An integral part of any software development is testing the software. Malfunctioning of
a software product which might have extreme consequences, asks for reasonable efforts
for its validation. For instance, a software that drives an airplane landing facility, in terms
of failure affects is different from a parking location finder program. It indicates that a
software project must focus on all required attributes before the product initialization. A
number of attributes to ensure the quality of the software is often considered as obvious.
The software is reliable, has usability, easily testable, efficient, portable and maintenance
is easy. Combining everything in a software project may deem unnecessary, sometimes
irrelevant or limited by the deploy environment. Therefore, prioritizing the relevant soft-
ware attributes would be a wise choice at the start of the project else the development
would lead to a fragile structural architecture. Apparently, software testing is a laborious
process that often resembles incompleteness. [17]
6.1 Software testing and data collection
One of the very basic and crucial elements of software testing is collecting the test data.
Necessarily, test data should resemble both the inputs and the outcomes of using those
inputs in different parts of the software. The inputs can be sorted as a group of inputs,
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individually, and a combination of two or more based on test requirements that should
also determine the specific outputs for each of them to be used. Notice that, the second
approach of determining the output can be very difficult for crucial feature test, since
simulating the proper output for any big process most often cannot be done by manual
calculation. It is also insufficient for critical systems to be tested.
Primarily we can divide software testing into two major parts. Manual and automated
testing. As the name implies, manual testing is a process of executing the software manu-
ally on the intended delivery environment, testing each function consecutively as it should
do in the real environment. Ont the other hand, in an automated procedure, the manual
test execution is replaced with test scripts, composed of diversified tools which are able to
execute the whole testing procedures pretending to be steered and asserting on test cases
by a human.
Software can be tested from a number of different execution angels. Out of many, we
will discuss a few that are most relevant to our technical solution.
6.1.1 Unit test
The title ’Unit test’ itself is self-describing. Unit test refers to the testing of the smallest
units of your software. Units can be a standalone functional component that provides
specific output for given a set of inputs. Tests are conducted with a variety of production
standard input data to simulate the function execution efficiencies in the production envi-
ronment. The test output should match the actual result of the expected output to qualify
for integration. While testing, the function can be stressed to its maximum providing rig-
orous inputs that should be handled without error. Unit testing can add great values, for
instance, on a monetary operation to check the accuracy. 1
1https://www.atlassian.com/continuous-delivery/software-testing
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6.1.2 Integration test
A test that covers multiple units to work as a whole to provide a single output can be
said as an integration test. Even though all units pass through the unit test, still it is
highly necessary to continue the integration test. Individual unit execution shouldn’t have
a doubt, but the integration of different units, for instance, can have a flaw in execution
order, incorrect input and output flow between units, input type mismatch. Often, the
acquisition of third-party libraries needed to accelerate the development speed and to
avoid development flaws. Writing unit tests for third party libraries seems inessential, but
integration tests. The dependencies are usually mocked to return the desired result.
6.1.3 End to end test
Integration test occupies multiple units together, where an end to end test depicts the
simulation of full user experience. Recall that, the dependencies and the back-end server
requests are usually faked in an integration test which is not the case in an end to end test.
A typical example would have the following steps:
1. Click "Create new user"
2. Read the instruction and fill-up the form
3. Submit
Here the network request to the API wouldn’t be mocked rather routed to the correct
path and then the request is processed by the corresponding functions before it returns
the final output. Since this process simulates the real user behavior and environment, the
underlying network protocol by default get involved in the test to establish a connection
between the UI and API, and returns to the proper request made from the UI after the
result is processed. Precisely, all the layers of a software execution are involved here that
verifies the accuracy of the software parts being tested.
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6.2 Test automation with CICD
A very well known popular term in software testing is CICD, a process of integration and
deployment to the production, which stands for continuous integration and continuous de-
livery. CICD facilitates all testing plans and strategies into a single pipeline that executes
all entities sequentially to deliver the codes into production on success. For instance, a
CICD pipeline can have the following levels of steps:
1. Run all test cases
2. Merge codes on success into the master branch
3. Staging or production deployment
Elaborately, the first step of the process is, a developer pushed his completed task
(codes) into the CICD pipeline. The execution of the predefined testing levels in the
pipeline starts immediately on the task one by one. If the task successfully passes through
the test execution pipeline, generally the next step is to merge the codes of the task into,
for example, master branch of the project. The tests passed, task merged, now it should
be fine to start the deployment of the task to the production or staging and it goes for
the deployment. All steps are well scripted that let the whole process run and executes
on required places automatically. In case of any failure in the CICD pipeline, the user
is immediately informed through predefined communication methods, e.g, SMS, email
halting the merge and deployment. Additionally, visual implementation of the CICD
pipeline command execution is pretty common that allows users to see on-screen what
went wrong. The user can take relevant actions to fix the task and push back again to
the CICD pipeline. Most of the programming language platforms have built their own
ecosystem for testing. Different types of programming-language specific tools and utili-
ties are built to ease the development of testing suites that are available to download using
the predetermined package manager.1
Adjacently, additional tools to perform test execution and test facilities development
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are very handy as well. Suitable third party test runner packages can be installed to dis-
pense the final output from the test suite. One of the widely used tools is measuring code
coverage. This tool demonstrates how much of the actual codes of the whole codebase is
covered under the tests written. At the end of the test, a table of code coverage report is
printed that highlights the percentage of codes and different parts of each file, e.g, func-
tions, statements covered in the test. Conveniently, most of the code editors also support
the visual demonstration of code coverage with the color marking on each line. Which
comes as pretty comprehensive to read and distinguish between the lines of codes that are
covered under test.
Contemporary test methodologies have replaced the customary methods. Previously,
testing software used to consider as a task of the Quality Assurance (QA) team. No more
that methodology is in active use nowadays, rather it is obsolete and the responsibility is
now tied to the developers as well. Developer’s empathy for the customers and products
considerably helps to build quality products and codes, else the absence of developers
in quality assurance typically lets the issues dormant into the code base for an unspec-
ified duration. Consequently, exposing these issues later requires extravagant efforts to
fix them. Inadvertently, this extravagant efforts may finally extends to hiring a new QA
team to handover the liability. CICD encourage developers to be aware of the customer
empathy and product’s quality to deliver a flawless user experience. The tests cases writ-
ten by the developers should cover the feature they work on properly. Overseeing them in
advance, being executed in the production environment also offer developers to maintain
the quality of the assigned task.1
CICD workflow offers enormous business benefits. As we discussed above, tradi-
tionally, the responsibilities of the QA team comprised of software testing and maintain
product quality. Chronologically, the liability has shifted to the developers now. It facili-
tates the release, QA and testing faster than the traditional approach and also cuts the cost
to spend after a managing separate QA team.
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6.3 Testing SCA integration model
While discussing testing, we mentioned programming language platforms have their own
built-in ecosystem for testing. The integration model has been developed in React, there-
fore, related choice for testing libraries are Jest2 or Enzyme3. We preferred Jest to con-
tinue as a basis of the testing framework. Jest has extensive support for a variety of
JavaScript frameworks e.g. Typescript, Babel, Node, React, Angular, Vue, which makes
it very popular to choose for software projects around the world. You need almost zero
configuration to start with jest apart from the installation part. Of course, it has tools and
options to configure your project as you want. One of the powerful features jest offers is,
tests are possible to run in parallel that uses the maximum of your machine’s computing
abilities saving time. It runs the failed test first on re-run and has filtering options as well
to filter out particular test files only to run rather whole. The user is given a handful of
options to filter out the test files that need to be run, for example, failed tests only, by
filename, etc.. At the end of the test, jest presents a table of test report contains how much
of the functions, statements, branch, lines are tested for each test file. Also, errors are
color-marked which is visually very comprehensive to read and troubleshoot. All unit
tests and integration tests are gracefully written in jest to be executed. The assertion li-
braries are free to choose from the market. Having this flexibility we tied React testing
library4 with jest to provide us plenty of helpful DOM testing utilities. The utilities are
helpful functions that can be used to manipulate the DOM efficiently, for instance, get an
element from the DOM by its data-testid, use a regular expression to search all elements
have text "Name" and a lot more. Moreover, Mocha5 and Chai6 are also integrated to
write asynchronous tests and make assertions on those test cases accordingly. If we take a
2https://jestjs.io/
3https://enzymejs.github.io/enzyme/
4https://github.com/testing-library/react-testing-library
5https://mochajs.org/
6https://www.chaijs.com/
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look back once at everything together, Jest works as a test runner, Mocha used for writing
asynchronous test cases (also synchronous), react testing library provides DOM utility
functions and finally Chai, helps on asserting the test cases.
Figure 6.3.1: End to end Cypress test
Jest test runner setup, at this moment we kept it limited to create unit tests and integra-
tion tests. What lacks from the Jest test is an end to end testing, to test the whole software
setup altogether with the API. Cypress7 filled-up this gap efficiently introducing end to
end test for Ecom software projects. It is fast, robust and very user friendly to debug
the tests. Top of that the package is open source for everyone to use. Writing test cases
in cypress is relatively easier than writing test cases in Jest. Since all API requests are
mocked in jest setup, we eliminate this limitation by using Cypress to create a real-time
simulation of user experiences and behavior. Surprisingly, Cypress generates videos for
all test cases that it runs, therefore debugging and finding out the reasons in case of test
fails are pretty comprehensive. Our SCA integration model necessarily involved with the
API to securely handle the connection to the Stripe and the secret access token. It is good
to know that Stripe offers a test API for our implemented model to be tested against it. On
7https://www.cypress.io/
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successful user and payment setup, the data is available in the test API. Manual checking
or writing automatic test cases can validate the information. However, The whole process
is not brought into the end to end test flow, instead, the required user subscription process
is simulated on end to end test flow. Figure 6.3.1 exhibit an end to end Cypress test sce-
nario for new user subscription and cancel a subscription. This parent file reused a couple
of underlying functions defined in the default configuration file that deals with the API
requests, database connection, and manipulation, and utility functions, e.g. cy.login(),
cy.visit(), cy.subscribePro(). Function login completes the user login with the required
data and makes sure the user is logged in, then visit navigates to the intended path.
Figure 6.3.2: CI test result
Cypress test report represented in Figure 6.3.2 speaks for the test cases written in
subscription-spec.js file (Figure 6.3.1). Two test cases as shown in the report passed
after running for 1 minute and 7 seconds. The test running duration usually varies in the
basis of computing resource availability. Except for the passing and failing, the report
also contains additional fields, for instance, pending, skipped, screenshots, which are
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mostly empty in this context but the video is true. The graphical test execution process
is recorded, and available at the end of the test in the corresponding path given in the
configuration file.
Figure 6.3.3: Code coverage report
It is worth checking how much of the actual codes have been covered in your tests.
sometimes, inappropriate test inputs discard the execution of conditional statements that
result in test incompleteness. Code coverage report helps to resolves this incompleteness,
demonstrating the missing and covered codes in the test file by the containing elements
e.g, statements, functions, lines. The code coverage report(Figure 6.3.3) for our integra-
tion model confirms almost 100% code coverage, which is visible at the top of the figure.
Fortunately, the Stripe testing API offers all set of failures and success cases to simu-
late the payment flow. To make sure the integration was a success, Stripe provides a set of
test cards and other information that helps to trigger the flow implemented in the system.
It is a strict "No" to use any genuine card number in the test environment. Triggering
the flow with test card information replicate the real user behavior with necessary events,
webhook call, and error handlers. Also, certain test card numbers are provided that trigger
3D challenge on-screen to test the challenge flow. On successful completion of the chal-
lenge trigger corresponding events or webhook call, that can be asserted on UI. Required
cypress test cases are written to handle the complete subscription process in real-time
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with Stripe test API that includes handling the customer creation, subscription manage-
ment, charging the customer card, informing customers immediately on charge fail, and
canceling the subscription. Developers locally make sure all test cases are passed, before
sending it to the final CICD pipeline.
The test setup and code integration are achieved through an in-house built CICD
pipeline. Once a new feature is built and pushed into the remote repository, the exe-
cution of the commands starts on the feature branch from the CICD pipeline. The setup
always varies based on the demands of the developer’s team or software project. In the
Ecom context, merging a feature branch into the master continues on test fails, alterna-
tively, deployment to the staging/production remains due until the feature branch passes
all tests along with other procedures remaining in the CICD pipeline.
Chapter 7
Discussion
The principal investigation focus of this thesis originally initiated from the revised pay-
ment service directive, PSD2. Throughout the exploratory journey above, we revealed
the unforeseen business benefits would bring by the PSD2 in financial markets. The sole
ownership of user data from ASPSPs, which will be in the shared domain along with
PISPs and AISPs, can have multidimensional compromised and improved business use
cases. Possibilities of data being abused by the adversaries were in the broad discussion if
it leads to the gradual decline of monetary exchanges in the financial market. Even though
ASPSPs are losing controls on their own data because of PSD2, we tried to answer could
they stress out the market willingly, limiting the amount of data to be shared with the
PISPs and AISPs. Moreover, the shared domain would be operated under the control of
the ASPSPs. Naturally, ASPSPs will be assigned with these additional tasks of handling
the authentication process, accepting and declining transaction requests, confirming the
privacy of the user is not disclosed to an unauthorized party. Since PSD2 itself didn’t
provide much insight on this, except the technical guide of implementing the services,
there are unidentified issues still left which have been adequately speculated in different
related parts of this dissertation. Strong Customer Authentication or SCA is one of the
major authentication changes requested in PSD2 to exchange the services between AISP,
PISP, and ASPSP. The fear, whether introducing an additional layer of security challenge
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could affect the market or not got mixed opinions from a few giant stakeholders. How-
ever, PSD2 SCA guideline answers who, when, what in the context of related parties but
lacked specific technical solutions. Later, Regulatory Technical Standards, RTS backed
up the technical requirements and formatting options without implying to any specific
technical framework that leaves the host open to choose their own. We put our efforts to
bridge this technical implementation gap inspecting a couple of reliable open source web
technology’s affordability in chapter 04.
Many PSPs have already developed their own solution following the RTS guidelines
to cope up with PSD2 before the due date. This new acquisition also forced their client
companies to upgrade their own local implementation to receive the payment services.
The model we developed and integrated into our system has tested most corner cases,
assuring compliance with the SCA regulation. Finally, the integration is backed up with
automatic test runner and deployment, which confirm the model is up and running.
Chapter 8
Conclusion
To what extent the security of the user data is ensured, in relation to the given access
of PISP and AISP to the client information and transaction history, addressed in this
article. The consequence of compromising data security to uplift the market share can
have a reverse effect on the decline of trade volume too. Lack of clear guideline in PSD2
put user’s privacy in stake. A wide range of service coverage by account information
service indicates a diverse increase in market growth, but do not address the pool of data
processing can payoff user’s privacy.
The normal ways of accessing user accounts, e.g, screen scraping were advocated for
a prohibition by the EBA since it cannot distinguish between the owner and other entities
seeking access. Being concerned about indistinguishable full account access, later version
of RTS made an exception, the user interface can be accessed only as a redundant system.
The solution is trustworthy during the normal operational time, however, falling back into
’screen scraping’ for a long time could let the adversaries circumvent the issue.
Strong customer authentication, SCA eases the security and privacy deficiencies in
open banking, introduced by the PSD2. Despite the fear, this additional layer of security
might not be appreciated and the overall impact would outweigh the security benefits.
SCA needs a draft model or ideas to be integrated within the collaborative authentication
process between PSP and ASPSP. RTS either didn’t resolve any implementation details
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of SCA. We figured out a couple of draft methods to be useful in the integration process
with its own pros and cons. Nevertheless, the PSPs have the freedom to rely on ASPSP’s
authentication system, or they can implement their own. However, implementing own
would be expensive in return to the actual benefits.
PSD2 wouldn’t be successful without strong cooperation among all involved parties
in the finance market. Marked weak spots or unclear terms of PSD2 do not point to the
inadequate protection of user’s privacy, instead, it demands amendment on incomprehen-
sible parts. On the other hand, it would be too early to predict it’s future now unless the
financial market runs for a while under this new regulation. Inevitably, the competent
authorities of the member states should be supervised, monitored accordingly, to reduce
the pressure on user account and data security.
SAML and OIDC are two viable solutions that can interact with the PSP during the
authentication process, in provision of any service request. The limitation of involving
the PSP, ASPSP and the user into an authentication mechanism let us sought methods
that comply with the intent. In addition to that, it should be remembered that an ASPSP
reserves the right to reject any suspected payment request. This means, even though a
request is coming through a valid PSP, that doesn’t mark the request as clean. Therefore,
fraud detection and response to the incidents are essential for gatekeeping on the PSP
side.
we exhibit an SCA integration model integrated into an e-invoicing system. A PSD2
compliant payment service provider Stripe offers a versatile range of payment services
and APIs, to be implemented on the client-side. Since payment requests will be failed
unless they are PSD2 compliant, it helps companies to be updated with the latest PSD2
changes in payment services to maintain successful payment flow in everyday business.
The model is then attached to the CICD pipeline with an automated test runner, to ensure
nothing going to get wrong without undiscovered.
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